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ABSTRACT
This paper studies the implications for general equilibrium asset
pricing of a recently introduced class of Kreps-Porteus non-expected
utility preferences, which is characterized by a constant intertemporal
elasticity of substitution and a constant, but unrelated, coefficient of
relative risk aversion.
It is shown that the solution to the "equity premium puzzle" doc-
umented by Mehra and Prescott [19851 cannot be found, for plausibly
calibrated parameter values, by simply separating risk aversion from inter-
temporal substitution. Rather, relaxing the parametric restriction on
tastes implicit in the time-addictive expected utility specification and
adopting Kreps-Porteus preferences in the direction of "more realism" is





Cambridge, MA 02138The purp of this paler is to study the implicatioiis for general
equilibrium asset )rici1g of the 1)aralflctric classof Kreps-Porteus
non-expccted utility preferences introduced recently by Epstein- Zin
[1987a1 and myself (Weil [19871).' These preferences generalize, iii a
non-expected utility framework, the cominoiily used time-additive,
isoelastic expected utility specification to allow for an independent
parametrization of attitudes toward risk and attitudes toward in-
tertemporal substitution. They are characterized by a constant in-
tertemporal elasticity of substitution and a constant, but unrelated,
coefficient of relative risk aversion, and thus relax the well-known
constraint intrinsic to time-additive, isoelastic expected utility that
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution be the inverse of the con-
stant coefficient of relative risk aversion.
Adopting this new class of preferences has clear benefits. Firstly,
these preferences do not impose a behavioral restriction on tastes
which is devoid of any theoretical rationale, and which has many un-
pleasant side-effects.2 Secondly, the data reject the time-additive ex-
pected utility restriction, as established by Epstein and Zin [1987b}.
Thirdly, from an analytical point of view, this class of Kreps-Porteus
preferences is very simple to work with and a very natural general-
ization of isoelastic preferences to uncertainty.
Yet, despite these advantages, it is legitimate and necessary to
wonder whether these new preferences contribute, even partially, to
the resolution of any the many outstanding asset pricing or con-
sumption theory puzzles. Do those puzzles disappear once pref-
erences are "correctly" specified and the expected,time-additive
utility restriction lifted? Can we conclude that the role wehad at-
tributed, in the empirical difficulties of frictionless asset pricing or
permanent income theories, to incomplete markets or liquidity con-
straints was misplaced, and that the only problem was in reality one
of mis-specification of preferences? It would be surprising that the
1See Kreps and Porteus [1978, 1979a, 1979b] for the axiomatic foundations of these
preferences.
2Among them figure prominently: i) the impossibility of replicating the behavior of agents
who are both moderately risk averse and yet very averse to intertemporal substitution (as
most available empirical evidence suggests is the case), and ii) the difficulty, pointed out by
Hall [1985], of determining whether regressions of log growth rates of consumption on mean
logreal interest rates provide an estimate of risk aversion or intertemporal substitution (see
my [1987] paper on this point).
1answer to these PUrl)OSCf1111Y provocative questions be positi\'e
and indeed it is not, as this paper will suggest.
The test to which this study submits this new parailietric class
of non-expected utility Preferences is the one devised by Melira and
Prescott [1985]: can an artificial representative agent economy, Cal-
ibrated with plausible parameter values and output process, repli-
cate the average secular level of the riskfree rate (0.75 %)andof
the risk premium on equity (6.20 %)?Weknow, from Mehra's and
Prescott's original work, that a representative agent economy with
CES, time-additive, expected utility preferences and complete mar-
kets cannot pass this test —becauseof the inability of the model
to "fit" both the level of the riskfree rate and the discrepancy be-
tween the safe and average risky rates. Does, however, an economy
in which agents are endowed with the Kreps-Porteus generalization
of CES preferences perform substantially better with respect to the
Mehra-Prescott touchstone? While intuition suggests that it might
—thesenew preferences afford an additional degree of freedom —
theanswer to this question is negative.
As I will demonstrate below, the risk premium depends, for plau-
sible calibrations of tastes and technology, almost exclusively on the
coefficient of relative risk aversion. But this implies that relaxing the
time-additive expected utility restriction on tastes does not substan-
tially alter the fact, documented by Mehra and Prescott, that the
model can replicate the risk premium only for astronomically high
levels of risk aversion —thusleaving the equity premium puzzle
intact. What emerges from the relaxation of this restriction and the
appropriate calibration of tastes, is, as we shall see, an additional
puzzle, centered around the riskfree rate: why is it, if consumers
are as averse to intertemporal substitution as some recent estimates
suggest, that the riskfree is so low?
The analysis proceeds as follows. Section 1 presents the model,
and solves for equilibrium asset prices and rates of return. Section
2 establishes the main results of the paper: separating risk aversion
from intertemporal substitution cannot, on its own, explain away the
equity premium puzzle documented by Mehra and Prescott [1985],
but instead highlights the existence of a "riskfree rate puzzle." The
conclusion summarizes the paper, and outlines directions for further
2research.
1. The basic framework
The economy is similar, expect for the agents' preferences, to the
one studied by Lucas [1978] and Mehra and Prescott [1985]. I first
describe technology and consumer behavior, and then compute equi-
librium asset returns.
1.1.Technology
Thereis one perishable consumption good, a fruit, which is pro-
duced by non-reproducible identical trees whose number is normal-
ized, without loss of generality, to be equal to the size of the con-
stant population. Let yg the the number of fruits falling from a
tree at time t, i.e., the "dividend" associated with holding a tree.
It is assumed that the rate of growth of dividends, A Yt+i/Yt,
is random and Markovian over a finite state space, with transition
probabilities given by3
= Prob{Aj+i = IA1=.X}, (1)
with i,j = 1,2,. .. I< 00,A> 0, and 1 Vi. The
uncertainty on dividends at t + 1, and thus on yg÷i/yj, is assumed
to be resolved at the beginning of period t + 1, before time t + 1
consumption and savings decisions are made.
1J2. Consumers
The economy is inhabited by many identical infinitely-lived con-
sumers. Let Pt, x1 and c1denote,respectively, the fruit price of a
tree at t, the number of (shares of) trees held at the beginning of
period 1, and consumption at t of a representative agent. The one-
period budget constraint facing a representative consumer is then
simply
ct+ptxt+i=(pt+yt)xt, t￿0, (2)
3The notation is purposefully similar to the one used by Mehra and Prescott [1985].
3with x0 > 0 givell. Letting R+1[pt+i + yt+il/ptdenotethe
one—period (random) rate of return on a tree,and i.vt(pt+y1)x1
represent beginning-of—period wealth,the budget constraint (2) can
be rewritten more compactly as
Wt+1=Rg+i(wj —cg). (3)
I assume that agents are not indifferent to the timingof the res-
olution of uncertainty on consumption lotteries (as they arewhen
preferences can be represented by a VonNeumann -Morgenstern
(VNM) utility index), and that their preferenceordering instead
satisfies axioms 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 and 3.1 in Kreps and Porteus [19781.
From these authors' theorem 1 and corollary 4 [ibid., pp.192 and
1991, and the results in Epstein-Zin [1987a],the representative con-
sumer's preference ordering over uncertain consumption lotteries can
be represented by sequence of functions V defined recursivelyby5
V1U[cg,EtVt+i1 (4)
where E1 denotes expectation conditional on informationavailable
at t. When the "aggregator" function U(.,.) is linearin its second
argument, (4) is the standard recursive equationcharacterizing the
VNM time-additive expected utility index (it is linear in probabili-
ties), and agents are indifferent to the timing ofresolution of uncer-
tainty over temporal consumption lotteries. As shown by Krepsand
Porteus [1978, p.199], (4) also allows for preference for early (resp.,
late) resolution when U(.,.) is convex (resp., concave)in its second
argument.
Following initial results by Farmer [1987], Epstein-Zin [1987a]
and myself [1987] have independently proposed the following func-
tional form6 for U(.,.):
U[c, EV] [i -)c1+ (EV)]', (5)
4The Kreps-Porteus axiornatization does not impose on temporal gambles the axiom of
reduction of compound lotteries satisfied, original static VNM theory, by preferences over
timeless gambles. It maintains, however, the so-called "independence" axiom, and axiomati-
cally imposes the temporal consistency of optimal plans.
5Throughout this paper, and as in Farmer [1987], I assume "payoff history independence"
—i.e.,that today's tastes are independent of previously realized consumptions.
6Epstein and Zin [1987a introduce a slightly different, but equivalent, parametrization.
4with p E R, y E R, and E (0, 1). i/p caneasilybe shownto
measure the constant intertemporal elasticityof substitution (IES),
and -y to parametrize the constant coefficient of relative risk aver-
sion (CRRA).7 The VNM time-additive expected utility specifica-
tion emerges, up to a monotone transformation, as the special case
in which -y = p, i.e., as the special case in which the CRRA is re-
stricted to be the inverse of the IES. The preferences defined by (4)
and (5) are thus a very natural generalization of CES utility to un-
certainty —onewhich does not impose the behaviorally groundless
restriction of time-additive expected utility.
To characterize the optimal consumption plan of the representa-
tive consumer, denote by V(w, A) the maximum utility attainable
by an agent who has wealth wg when the state of nature at t,sum-
marized by the realized growth rate of dividends, is .Thisvalue
function is the solution to the following functional equation:
V(wg,)) = argrnaxU[ct,EtV(wt+i,Ai÷i)] subject to (3),(6)
where the aggregator function U(.,.) is defined in equation (5). This
functional equation of course reduces to the standard linear Bellman
equation in the time-additive case -y = p. The first-order condition
for the maximization problem in (6) is simply
U1 = U21E[R+1V1+1], (7)
where U denotes the derivative of the aggregator function with
respect to its i-th argument (i = 1,2) evaluated at (cj, E1V1),
and V1 the derivative of the value function with respect to wealth
evaluated at (wg, As). Using the envelope theorem and (7), one finds:
V1 = U2E[R+1V1+1] = U1. (8)
Notice, from (8), that while it remains true, with Kreps-Porteus
preferences, that an optimum program is characterized by the equal-
ization of the marginal utility of wealth, V1, to the marginal util-
ity of consumption, LT1,8thelatter depends (unless utility is time-
7This terminology is best justified by noting that, in the absence of uncertainty, y plays
no role [it can be eliminated by a monotone increasing transformation of (3)], in which case
the standard time-additive CES utility obtains with sub-utility cr"— sothat 1/p is un-
ambiguously the IES. Moreover, the proportional risk premium for a lottery on permanent
consumption is proportional to y, with the constant of proportionality reflecting the variance
of the lottery (see Weil (1987]) —whencethe usual interpretation of y as being the CRRA.
8For a framework in which this equality is violated, see Grossman and Laroque [1987].
5additive) on expected future value. In the present framework,
changes in the marginal utility of wealth do not solely reflect, in op-
timal plan, changes in non-durable consumption, but also changes
in expected future utility. Kreps-Porteus preferences thus introduce
an effect very similar, at a formal level, to the one which would
be associated with non-separabilities iii consumer durables or go'-
ernment purchases. This is the reason why they are, a priori, a
good candidate for explaining asset pricing or consumption theory
puzzles.
Substituting (8) into (9) yields the following Euler equation:
Et{U2lt+1R+1}=1,
(9)
which reduces to its familiar VNM form when the aggregator func-
tion is linear in its second argument, i.e., when U2 is a constant.
An analogous expression,
Et{U2t1t+1Rkt+1} =1, (10)
can be shown to hold for any asset with rate of return Rkj+1 which
is heldbyour representative consumer, and can be used, without
rewriting the budget constraint (3)orredefining wealth, to price, in
equilibrium, any inside asset in zero net supply.
To complete the characterization of the optimal consumption pro-
gram, it suffices to compute, from (3) and (5), the marginal rate of
substitution U2U1÷1/U1. After some tedious but straightforward
computations (see the Appendix), one finds that, for any asset with
rate of return RkL which is voluntarily held, it must be the case that
LILt+1J ''ILkt+1=1
an equation which holds, in particular, for the rate of return on
trees (Rk =Re).As Epstein and Zin [1987a] emphasize, an equation
such as (11) suggests that that the covariance between the return on
asset k and the return on the market portfolio (for which R+1 also
stands for in this representative agent economy with only one type
of tree and the other stores of value being inside assets) should be,
6in addition to covariance with consumption growth, a determinant
of excess returns —unless,of course, utility is time-additive, in
which case the "standard" consumption capital asset pricilig model
(C-CAPM) obtains. While this observation can in principle explain
the unsatisfactory empirical performance of the C-CAPM relative
to the portfolio based CAPM,9 its general equilibrium implications,
which I examine next, do not lend it much support: the particular
departure from the C-CAPM embodied in (11) does not help solve
the equity premium puzzle.
1.3. Equilibrium prices and returns
In equilibrium, each representative agent must hold one tree (re-
member the normalization of section 1.1), i.e., Xt = 1 for all t. By
Walras' law, this requires, from (2), that the entirety of period t
(perishable) output be consumed during that period, so that
Cj= ygVt. (12)
Turningfirst to the determination of the equilibrium price of
tree, and proceeding as in Mehra and Prescott [1985], I look for a
"stationary" equilibrium such that Pt = WiYt if the level output at
t is Yt and i is the state of state of nature at t(therealized rate of
growth of output between t —1 and t was \).Notethat this implies
that the rate of return on a tree if state i is realized today and state
jtomorrowis simply
_Pt+i+Yt+i—wj+1 R1— — A). 1
Pt Wi
Insertingthis expression into the Euler equation (11), and using
the market clearing condition (12) together with the specification
(1) of the dividend process, one finds after a few straightforward
manipulations that the wi's (i = 1,. .., I),which fully character-
ize equilibrium, are the non-negative solution, if it exists,1° to the
9See Mankiw andShapfro [1986].
10Somerestrictions on tastes and technology are of course necessary to ensure existence.
They are henceforth assumed to be satisfied
7following system of I non-linear equations:
WI = {1A(w+ 1) } (14)
fori=1,...,I.
The expected rate of return on a tree (i.e., on equity) if today's
state is i is then simply, from (13),
ER1 = Wi + 1•
(15)
j=1
I now turn to the computation of the riskfree rate, RF1, prevailing
if today's state is i. The Euler equation (11) implies that the price





The (proportional) equity premium, 11ER1/RF1, if today
state is i is thus simply, using (14), (15) and (16),
{=51A(w+ i)} + i)} 11= . (17)
=i 15A (wj + 1)T
Notice that in the absence of uncertainty we indeed have, as
should be expected, 11 =1,i.e., that the (conventionally defined)
net risk premium is zero.
2. Kreps-Porteus preferences, the equity premium puzzle,
and the riskfree rate puzzle
I now turn to the implications of this framework for the analysis
of one of the most striking asset pricing puzzles uncovered by the
literature. In a thought provoking paper, Mehra and Prescott [1985J
show that the Arrow-Debreu, representative agent framework with
8time-additive CES expected utility preferences cannot account, ex-
cept for astronomical values of the CRRA (or, equivaleiitly in that
setting, extremely low values of the IES), during the period 1889—
1978, for both the average level of the riskfree rate (0.75 %)andthe
discrepancy (6.20 %)betweenthe average rate of return on equity
(6.95 %)andon risklcss securities.
Mehra and Prescott present this "puzzle" in the illuminating
form of a dilemma. In the time-additive, expected utility frame-
work which they consider (in which the CRRA is the inverse of the
IES), a very high CRRA (of the order of 40 or 50) does make it pos-
sible to replicate the large secular premium on equity; yet, because
it is synonymous with a very low IES, it also leads to the counterfac-
tual prediction of an extremely high riskfree rate! Conversely, a low
CRRA leads to a counterfactually low equity premium, although it
does imply a relatively low riskfree rate.
It thus might seem that the major hurdle to be overcome iii
solving the equity premium puzzle is a purely technical one. Inde-
pendently parametrizing the IES and the CRRA should provide the
additional degree of freedom which is required to replicate both the
level of the riskfree rate and the discrepancy between the safe and
the average risky rate. The implicit reasoning is, of course, that the
riskfree rate is mainly "controlled" by the magnitude of the IES,
while the risk premium is a reflection of the CRRA.
I now demonstrate —boththeoretically for the case of i.i.d. div-
idend growth processes, and numerically for the non-i.i.d. case —
thatthis argument not only does not provide a solution to the eq-
uity premium puzzle, but also highlights the existence of a riskfree
rate puzzle.
2.1.Li.d. dividend growth
Suppose that the rate of growth of dividends is i.i.d., so that today's
state of nature conveys no information as to future dividend, and
hence consumption, growth.1' We should, therefore, expect the fruit
price of a tree, p, to be, relative to the "size" y of the economy, a
state-independent constant. Formally, since the assumption of i.i.d.
11As Mehra and Prescott [1985] note, this is not a blatantly counterfactual assumption: the
rate of growth of consumption only exhibits a small negative serial correlation over the period.
9dividend growth is equivalent, from (1), to specifying
=Vj,ie{i,...,I}, (18)
itis obvious, from the equilibrium asset pricing formu1 given in
(14), that
=w Vi, (19)
i.e.,that the equilibrium price function is simply g = wyg, where w
is a constant determined by substituting (19) into (14); the price-
dividend ratio is a constant when dividend growth is i.i.d.
An immediate implication of (19) is that, with i.i.d. dividend
growth, the average risky and safe rates are state-independent [see
equations (15) and (16)], and so is the equity premium H. Its
constant magnitude, denoted by IT, is simply, using (17) to (19),
={,s} {>c5jAT} (20)
From equation (20)12 can be drawn what is possibly the most
striking result of this paper: with i. i. d. dividend growth, the equity
premium, when defined in relative terms, is independent of the IES,
and reflects only the properties of the dividend growth process and,
of course, the magnitude of the CRRA.13
To understand this result, it suffices to remember that, with i.i.d.
uncertainty, optimal consumption is a constant fraction of wealth.'4
The rate of growth of consumption is, therefore, proportional to
R+,, the rate of return on the "market" portfolio [see equation (3)].
As a consequence, the marginal rate of substitution depends only
on R+,, and the Euler equation (3) reduces to
E {RT, Rkg+1} = 1, (21)
'2Note that (20) confirms the interpretation given in the text of i as the coefficient of
relative risk aversion.
13Analogous results have been obtained by Barsky [19861 whithin a two-period framework
based on Selden's [1978] "ordinal certainty equivalence" preferences.
14Preferences are homothetjc —sothat the ratio of consumption to wealth depends, at most,
on the state of nature. Dividend growth is i.i.d., so that this ratio (equal to the marginal and
average propensity to consume) is a constant —becausetoday's state of nature conveys no
information as to the future.
10which is the condition characterizing the static optimal portfolio al-
location chosen by au agent with a CRRA equal to 7! Equation
(21) simply establishes'5 that an interteinporal program reduces, in
practice, to a sequence of disconnected static problems when under-
lying uncertainty is i.i.d.'6 But then, it is not surprising that, as
equation (20) shows, the risk premium on equity depends only (for
a given output process) on 'y, and that p be irrelevantsince in-
tertemporal considerations play no role in the determination of the
optimal program with i.i.d. uncertainty.
While this result confirms the intuitive argument presented supra
(the CRRA controls the risk premium, and the IES the level of
the riskfree rate), it also proves very decisively that relaxing the
time-additive expected utility restriction cannot possibly help solve
the Mehra-Prescott equity premium puzzle when dividend growth
is i.i.d. For any y, the equity premium is the same irrespective of
whether p is equal to or different from y ,i.e.,irrespective of whether
the expected, time-additive utility restriction is satisfied or not
Therefore, allowing attitudes towards risk to be parametrized inde-
pendently from behavior towards intertemporal substitution cannot,
with i.i.d. dividend growth, afford any improvement whatsoever over
the results of Mehra and Prescott: independently of the value one
might want to select for p (the inverse of the IES), one wiU still
need implausibly (of the order of 40) high values of 'y (the CRRA)
to replicate the observed 6.20 %riskpremium on equity. The equity
premium puzzle ("why is the risk premium so large if consumers are
only moderately risk averse?") thus remains intact.
Another implication of the foregoing results is that relaxing, for
a given y, the time-additive expected utility restriction in the di-
rection of more plausible parameter values might, while leaving the
equity premium unchanged, deteriorate the ability of the model to
replicate the level of the riskfree rate. It is commonly estimated
that the CRRA is in the range of 1 to 5, with both theoretical (Ar-
row [1965]) and empirical (Epstein-Zin [1987b}) grounds for thinking
that it is in fact closer to 1. The implied values for the IES under
the expected, time-additive utility restriction, 0.2 to 1, run counter
15See Huang and Litzenberger [1988] for a proof in the VNM case.
'6See Giovannini and Vei1 [1988] for an elaboration of this and other related issues.
11to the belief that consumers are in fact very averse to intertemporal
substitution, and thus seem to overestimate the "true" intertempo-
ral elasticity of substitution (i.e., underestimate the "true" p). But
it is easy to show [from (16) and the assumption of i.i.d. growthj
that increasing p while maintaining y fixed may very well result,
depending on the specification of the output process, in an increase
in the predicted riskfree rate far over and above the already too high
levels associated with the expected utility restriction! That this is
indeed the case when the output process is calibrated to fit historical
data is confirmed below.
The adoption of Kreps-Porteus preferences thus cannot in itself
solve the equity premium puzzle. Instead, it highlights the existence
of a new puzzle, focused on the riskfree rate: "why is it, if consumers
are so averse to consumption fluctuations, that the riskfree rate is
so low?"
I now turn to a numerical examination of the non-i.i.d. case,
which confirms and amplifies the preceding results.
2.2. Non-i.i.d. dividend growth process
As the non-linear nature of equations (14) makes it clear, one has
to resort to numerical methods to solve for the equilibrium price
function, as summarized by the wi's, when the dividend growth
process is not i.i.d.
Mehra and Prescott observe that the evolution of the rate of
growth of aggregate consumption (and thus, in this model, "div-
idends"), is well approximated, over the period 1889—1978, by a
two-state stochastic process





These magnitudes are used to solve for the w2's in (14), as ve1l
as for the state-dependent rikiess and expected risky rates.
12The Markov Process fl (23)-(22) has a probability 1 = [1 —
— —=1/2 of being in the good state, A, in the
long-run.Given the three paraiiieters , and p whicli parametrize,
respectively, consumers' attitudes toward impatience, risk, and in-
tertemporal substitution, this ergodic l)robabilitY, ,canbe used,
as in Mehra and Prescott [1985], to compute the long-run average
riskfrce rate, RF = RF' + (1 —)RF2,and the long-run average
equity premium, H H1 + (1 —)ll2,which are implied by the
model. The results, reported in Table I for the case of ,8 = 95%,17
i/p between 2 and 0.1, and 'y between 0.5 and 10, are as distressing
for the representative agent, complete market model as Mehra's and
Prescott's.
Under the expected time-additive utility restriction p = ,de-
creasing the intertemporal elasticity of substitution amounts to in-
creasing the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and results in the
simultaneous rise of the risk premium and the riskfree rate —aprop-
erty at the origin of the "dilemma" faced by Mehra and Prescott.
The largest risk premium one can obtain under these circumstances
in that parameter range is 2.33 %, a magnitude which not only falls
far short of the observed 6.25 %, but also is associated with a riskfree
rate way too large (17.87 % instead of 6.25 %)!
Relaxing the restriction p = 'y improves matters only slightly.
For any intertemporal elasticity of substitution l/p, increasing the
coefficient of relative risk aversion y raises the risk premium and
lowers the riskfree rate. For any coefficient of relative risk aversion
7, decreasing the intertemporal elasticity of substitution raises the
riskfree rate, and the risk premium.'8
This last result is very troublesome, in light of the fact that the
riskfree rate is very sensitive, while the risk premium reacts very
little, to declines in the IES.19 It implies, as suggested above, that
abandoning the time-additive expected utility restriction to adopt
'TA subjective discount rate, /3, closer to 1 improves the ability of the model to replicate the
levelofthe riskfree rate, but only marginally so in light of the magnitude of the discrepancy
between the predicted and observed magnitudes.
18While the explanation of the first effect is straightforward in each of these two comparative
statics general equilibrium experiments, the rationale of the second result is more obscure.
These results are moreover not independent of the specification of the output process.
19The rationale for those different reactions is, of course, that dividend growth is almost
i.i.d. for the case 4'=422 = 0.43 considered here.
13more "plausible" parameter values in fact worsens the ability of the
model to replicate historical rates. As Table I demonstrates, relaxing
the p = y restriction in the direction of "more realism" (a smaller
IES, i.e., p > y) will, for any reasonable coefficient of relative risk
aversion., dramatically increase the risk-free rate beyond its already
large value, while only slightly increasing the risk premium. For
instance, for -y = 1 (logarithmic risk preferences), the predicted risk
premium is 0.12 % for i/p = 1 (i.e., when the VNM restriction
is satisfied), and 0.45 % when i/p = 0.1 (the value estimated by
Epstein and Zin [1987b]): both magnitudes fall far short of the
observed 6.2 %.Asfor the riskfree rate, it rises from 7.03 %when
i/p = 1 to 24.91 % when i/p = 0.1!
One must., therefore, conclude that, for empirically calibrated pa-
rameter values, the "equity premium puzzle" is in fact compounded
by a "riskfree rate" puzzle, which the use of the Kreps-Porteus pref-
erences (4) and (5) helped bring into light: why is it, if agents are
as averse to intertemporal substitution as most empirical estimates
suggest they are, that the riskfree rate is so much lower than the rep-
resentative agent, complete market model predicts it should be?2°
Abandoning time-additive expected utility thus deepens the mystery
and extends the puzzle outlined by Mehra and Prescott.
Conclusion
This paper has studied the implications for general equilibrium asset.
pricing of a recently introduced class of Kreps-Porteus non-expected
utility preferences, which is characterized by a constant intertempo-
ral elasticity of substitution and a constant, but unrelated, coeffi-
cient of relative risk aversion.
It has been shown that the solution to the "equity premiumpuz-
zle" documented by Mehra and Prescott [1985] cannot be found by
simply separating risk aversion for intertemporal substitution. If
20Table I shows that the riskfree rate puzzle survives, but less strikingly, if one believes
that the IES is not as small (0.1) as the estimates of Epstein and Zin suggest. The issue is,
of course, which weight to attach to an aggregate estimate of the IES which implies avery
negative interest elasticity of savings, and is thus in conflict with life-cycle estimates (which
point to an almost zero aggregate interest elasticity of savings). Its resolution, which obviously
involves questions related to Ricardian equivalence and bequest motives, is outside the scope
of this paper —whichis aggregative by design.
14the dividend growth proccss is i.i.d, the risk premium, wlicii ap-
propriately defined, is independent of the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution, and thus is be the same whether or not the time-
additive, expected utility restriction is imposed. When the dividend
growth process is non-i.i.d., relaxing the par restriction on tastes im-
plicit in the time-additive expected utility specification and adopting
Kreps-Porteus preferences in the direction of 'more realism' adds, if
anything, a "riskfree rate puzzle" to Mehra's and Prescott's 'equity
premium puzzle."
From here, research may proceed into two directions. On the one
hand, one might examine the further implications of the generaliza-
tion of CES preferences achieved by Epstein-Zin [1987a] and myself
[1987]. It is likely, as this paper already suggests, that the relaxing
the time-additive, expected utility restriction will not solve all as-
set pricing and consumption theory puzzles. it might solve some of
them, but one should not delude oneself into thinking that it will
solve all of them; market imperfections undoubtedly submerge, in
terms of empirical effects, the biases introduced this particular mis-
specification of preferences. On the other hand, one might concen-
trate on elucidating Mehra's and Prescott's "equity premium puz-
zle" and the "riskiree rate puzzle" highlighted in this paper. As sug-
gested by recent work by Constantinides [1987] and Mason [1987]
on habit formation, it might well be the case that other classes of
preferences than the one explored in this paper might explain the
puzzles explored in this study. But it is likely that market imper-
fections will, in the end, empirically hold center stage: both the
equity premium and riskfree rate puzzles could be explained, for in-
stance, by introducing undiversifiable idiosyncratic risk. The issue
is, of course, to find a theoretically adequate way of rationalizing
and explaining the presence of such imperfections.21
21See Ben Zvi and Sussman [1988] for a recent attempt.
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17Appendix: Derivation of the Euler equation
This appendix derives equation (11) in the text. The proof requires, from (10),
computing the marginal rate of substitution
M U2U11/U1. (Al)
It proceeds in two steps, exploiting the characteristics of the aggregator function
(5) and of the optimal program.
Al. Value function and consumption function
Because of the homogeneity properties of the aggregator function, of the inter-
pretation of y as the CRRA, and of the fact that preferences are isoelastic, guess
that the value function can be written in the form
V(w,.\) =A(A)w, (A2)
where A(.) is an unknown function, and that the consumption function is linear
in wealth:
c1 =p(X)w, (A3)
where p) is the state-dependent marginal propensity to consume. It is easy
to show, performing the maximization called for by (6), that the functions A(.)







whereO =Et{A(X1+1)[Rt+1]Y} i--.Giventhe specification in (1) of a dis-
crete state space, these expressions yield 21 equations in the 21 unknowns
[A1,1z1][A\),j41)], i =1,...,I, which can in principle be solved. Al-
though the solution is closed in a only a few cases, the analysis which follows
does not require the existence of such explicit forms.
Using the budget constraint (3) along with (A3), (A4) and (A5) imply that,
along an optimal program,
- R' (A6)
A'.X'R' C ' +i)+i t
an expression which will be used infra.
18A2. Computationof the marginal rate of substitution
From(5), it is straightforward to show that the marginal rate of sUl)stitution




where V.÷1 denotes the value function evaluated at (Wt+i, Using the
budget constraint (3) along with (A2) and (A3), one finds that
1—p 1itVA(A1+1)R'
(AS)
so that, substituting (A6) and (AS) into (A7), we find that
C M=/3(±t!) R÷1 R+1 (A9)
an expression whid, inserted in (10), yields the Euler equation (11).
19IES CRRA ()
(l/p) .5

































Note: the first number in each box is the average net risk premium, i.e.,
100(11 —1);the second number, in bold characters, is the average net
riskfree rate, i.e., 100(RF —1)
Table 1: Net risk premium and riskfree rate, in percent, for selected values of y
and p (/3= 95%)
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